



The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first 
impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced 
between February 18, 2014 and September 4, 2014.  This collection, 
written by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 11 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2014). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
Hannon v. City of Newton, 744 F.3d 759 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has the 
authority “to discharge a portion of its tax liens on a piece of real property 
taken by eminent domain in exchange for payment from that taking while 
asserting the remaining value of its liens on any proceeds that the taxpayer 
obtains in a state post-taking suit for under compensation damages.”  Id. 
at 761. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that 26 U.S.C. § 6325(b)(2)(A) 
“gives the IRS discretion to discharge” property from a tax lien if the IRS 
is paid an amount, ‘which shall not be less than the value’ of its interest in 
that property.”  Id. at 765.  The court posited that most of the IRS’s 
discharges “occur to facilitate the transfer of encumbered property,” and 
to “give clear title to the purchaser.”  Id. at 765–66.  The court further 
noted that the controlling federal law provides that the government’s lien 
“attaches ‘to all property and rights to property’ held by a delinquent 
taxpayer . . . ” and that once a federal lien is enacted, “it automatically 
attaches to any property” that the delinquent taxpayer later acquires.  Id. 
at 769. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that the IRS discharge under [26 
U.S.C. § 6325(b)(2)(A)] did not surrender the government’s tax lien on 
the proceeds of the taxpayer’s post-taking suit.”  Id. 
 
López-Muñoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 
1959 (“FEHBA”), found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914, “completely preempts 
local-law tort and contract claims arising out of a refusal by a FEHBA 
insurer to cover a medical procedure.”  Id. at 2. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit stated that “the linchpin of the complete 
preemption analysis is whether Congress intended that federal law provide 
the exclusive cause of action for the claims asserted by the plaintiff.”  Id. 
at 5.  The court noted that cases in which the Supreme Court found 
complete preemption share a common factor: “exclusive federal regulation 
of the subject matter of the asserted state claim, coupled with a federal 
cause of action for wrongs of the same type.”  Id.  The 1st Circuit further 
determined, in regard to the FEHBA, the preemption clause “is not 
sufficiently broad enough to confer federal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 6.  The 7th 
Circuit is the only other circuit to address this issue and also did not read 
the FEHBA as affecting complete preemption.  Id. at 8. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the FEHBA does not 
completely preempt local-law claims relating to the denial of benefits.” Id. 
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Millay v. Me. DOL, 762 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the limitations period applicable ”to an action 
for judicial review brought pursuant to” 29 U.S.C. § 722(c)(5)(J)  (the 
Rehabilitation Act) should be guided by state law or the default of the 
federal catch-all statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).  Id. at 153. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit examined how Congress amended Title 
I of the Rehabilitation in 1998 to include “a different default rule for a civil 
action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990” 
because prior to this, the Rehabilitation Act did not contain a statute of 
limitation period.  Id. at 155. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
noted that the Supreme Court previously held that “if the plaintiff’s claim 
against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment of 
Congress, the [catch-all] limitations period applies.”  Id.  The court 
emphasized that “[i]t was these 1998 amendments to the Rehabilitation 
Act that enabled the plaintiff to bring the current proceeding for judicial 
review.”  Id.  The 1st Circuit reasoned that there was “simply no 
justification for hinging the applicability of [§ 1658(a)] on whether or not 
the relevant statute created a new substantive violation of federal law.”  Id. 
at 156. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “the right to judicial review that 
the statute creates is subject to the general catch-all limitations period 
contained in  § 1658(a).”  Id. at 157. 
 
OMJ Pharms., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.3d 333 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a U.S. taxpayer is required to reduce its credit 
cap under 26 U.S.C. § 936(j)(5)(D) by the amount of the credit-eligible 
income associated with the line of business, when the business is sold to a 
foreign corporation that does not pay U.S. corporate income taxes, and 
thus has no credit cap to increase.  Id. at 334. 
ANALYSIS: The court, when interpreting § 936, tried to create a 
framework very similar to that of 26 U.S.C. § 41(f)(3), which governs “the 
calculation of the tax credit for increases in research expenditures.”  Id. at 
336.  The 1st Circuit noted that the plain text of the statute “does not read 
as one would expect it to had Congress intended that all sales of business 
lines would decrease a seller’s cap.”  Id. at 340.  The court found through 
the nature of the possessions tax regime, and the structure of the statute, 
that Congress’s attention was on the Puerto Rican economy when enacting 
this statute.  Id. at 341.  The court further found that § 936 was aimed at 
leaving the balance of caps in Puerto Rico unaffected, and that having a 
reduction in a seller’s cap when there would not be an increase would 
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offset this balance and would have “marginally decreased the size of the 
transitional cushion.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “a reduction in a seller’s cap 
as a result of the sale of a business line is appropriate only in the event of 
a corresponding increase in the buyers cap,” and that when there is no 
claim that the taxpayer’s sale of a business line to a foreign corporation 
increased or could have increased the foreign company’s credit cap, the 
sale does not reduce the taxpayer’s credit cap under § 936(j)(5)(D).  Id. 
 
Ortiz-Graulau v. United States, 756 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2014). 
QUESTION: Whether the term “use” under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 means 
to “to employ or avail oneself of the use of a minor in order to create a 
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct” or has a narrower meaning 
in the context of a consensual sexual relationship with a minor.  Id. at 17. 
ANALYSIS: The Court noted that other circuits including the 2nd, 4th 
and 8th have held that “the ‘use’ element in § 2251 is met when a 
defendant intentionally films or photographs a minor’s sexually explicit 
conduct.”  Id. at 18.  The 1st Circuit reasoned that in enacting § 2251, 
“Congress intended a broad ban on the production of child pornography 
and aimed to prohibit the varied means by which an individual might 
actively create it.”  Id.  As such, the court found that “use” should be given 
its plain dictionary meaning in the broadest sense.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Court held that the term “use” under § 2251 is 
satisfied when the defendant “was actively and directly involved in 
producing a sexually explicit depiction of a minor even in the absence of 
a complaining witness or the prosecution’s inability to identify the specific 
minor.”  Id. at 19. 
 
Riley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) “must be treated as a continuing violation or as an installment 
contract, with a new accrual date starting a new limitations period for each 
payment.”  Id. at 246. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd , and 9th Circuits have 
addressed and rejected the same type of accrual theory that the plaintiff 
presents in an ERISA context.  Id.  The 1st Circuit found it particularly 
persuasive that the plaintiff did not present any district court opinions that 
apply his accrual approach.  Id. at 247.  The court noted that the 1st Circuit, 
in a previous case, stated in dicta that it “speculated that if the City was 
required to make periodic payments, and successively underpaid 
[plaintiff], a claim might arise each time a payment was made,” but that 
this case was distinguishable from the present case.  Id. (internal quotation 
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marks omitted).  The court concluded that ERISA’s purposes of 
encouraging employers to “offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of 
liabilities,” and that the rejection of the accrual theory furthers this goal of 
predictability.  Id. at 248. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that a disability plan does not 
have to “be treated as a continuing violation or as an installment contract 
with a new accrual date starting a new limitations period for each 
payment.”  Id. at 246. 
 
United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether Massachusetts’s Daytime and Nighttime 
Breaking and Entering (“B&E”) offenses can be characterized under 18 
U.S.C. § 16(b) as crimes of violence.  Id. at 15. 
ANALYSIS: The court first examined a previous 1st Circuit decision, 
United States. v. Brown, 631 F.3d 573 (1st Cir. 2011), which held that 
“nighttime B&E did not qualify as a ‘crime of violence’ under the residual 
clause of the career offender provision” of sentencing guideline U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2.  Id. at 7 (citation omitted).  Next, the court turned to its decision 
in United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2012), which held that a 
district court’s holding that the daytime B&E statute, found at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) was a “violent felony” was plainly erroneous.  Id. at 7.  Relying 
on these two decisions, the court noted that they were based on the 
“breadth of the ‘building’ element,” meaning that building within the 
statute included so many structures that the threat of violence towards a 
person was more unlikely than the theft of property.  Id. at 8. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the defendant’s “prior 
convictions for daytime B&E and nighttime B&E are not categorically 
crimes of violence under § 16(b).”  Id. 
 
United States v. Roberson, 752 F.3d 517 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s prior conviction, that was 
subsequently vacated, qualifies as a “predicate offense” under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).  Id. at 521. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit reasoned that SORNA, defines the term 
“sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.”  Id. 
at 521.  The court explained that Congress has stated that “‘convicted’ 
refers to the historical fact of the conviction, regardless of whether that 
conviction might later be vacated.”  Id. at 522.  Thus, the court reasoned 
that the term “‘was convicted’ refers to the fact of conviction and does not 
refer only to a ‘valid’ conviction.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the registration requirement 
under SORNA “applies to a person who ‘was convicted’ of a sex offense 
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regardless of whether that conviction is later vacated, when federal charges 
have been brought for conduct before the vacation of conviction.”  Id. at 
519. 
 
United States v. Sep’lveda-Hernández, 752 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether “the statute doubling the maximum 
available penalty for drug distribution in close proximity to a youth 
center . . . creates an independent substantive offense or, instead, operates 
merely as a sentencing-enhancing factor[.]”  Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “ten of our sister circuits have 
grappled with the same question, and all of them have concluded that 
§ 860(a) creates an independent substantive offense, not merely a 
sentence-enhancing factor.”  The court further noted there was not 
contrary circuit court precedent, and concluded that the “consensus 
position is correct, and that a statute ought to be read as a whole.”  Id. at 
27 (citation omitted).  The court reasoned that it would have been strange 
for “Congress to describe a person as having been convicted under a 
sentencing factor – and we do not think that Congress indulged such an 
awkward locution here.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that § 860(a) creates an 
independent substantive offense, but that the evidence presented at trial 
“was insufficient to support convictions for that offense.” Id at 25. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether “the defendant can be held to account on 
a lesser included offense theory under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),” even though 
“the evidence was insufficient to ground convictions under § 860(a).”  Id. 
at 25. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 10th 
Circuits have held that a multi-step test is used to determine “whether a 
particular case create[s] an environment suitable for the exercise of § 2106 
authority.”  Id. at 28.  The court concluded that the “multi-step test 
provides the proper analytic framework in a § 2106 inquiry,” and when it 
utilized this test, the court found that injustice would not occur under this 
specific case.  Id. at 29, 31. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that under § 860(a), the 
defendant can “be held to account on a lesser included theory under 
§ 841(a)(1). Id. at 25. 
 
United States v. Suárez-González, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14005 (1st 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a U.S.S.G. §2B5.1(b)(2)(A) sentencing 
enhancement applies when the defendant did not use a “counterfeiting 
device” to make counterfeit postal money orders, but rather, conventional 
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equipment used by the U.S. Postal Service on authentic money order 
blanks.  Id. at *5–6. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under §2B5.1(b)(2)(A), a two-level 
sentencing enhancement applies when the defendant has “manufactured or 
produced any counterfeit obligation . . . of the United States, or possessed 
or had custody of or control over a counterfeiting device or materials used 
for counterfeiting.”  Id.  The court reasoned that “the term ‘counterfeiting 
device’ has a plain, ordinary, and unambiguous meaning: a device used 
for counterfeiting.”  Id. at *6.  The court looked to the Sentencing 
Commission, which defined counterfeit as “an instrument that has been 
falsely made, manufactured, or altered.”  Id. at *6–7 (emphasis added).  
The court further noted that “the Sentencing Commission stated 
unreservedly that the . . .  definition [of counterfeit] was meant to insure 
that altered instruments are treated as counterfeit and sentenced under 
§2B5.1.”  Id. at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the court 
reasoned that “[t]he authenticity of the printer in no way diminishes 
the counterfeit nature of the ersatz money orders printed at the 
[defendant’s] direction.”  Id. at *9–10. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that,”[b]y arranging for the 
printing of fake dollar amounts on otherwise worthless money order 
blanks, the appellant ‘altered’ those blanks — and this alteration was 
accomplished through the use of a machine . . . ” and thus, the device was 
used to create counterfeit money orders and the sentencing enhancement 
applies.  Id. at *9–12. 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 
173 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the bar on extraterritorial application of the 
United States securities laws, as set forth in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), precludes claims arising out of foreign-
issued securities purchased on foreign exchanges, but cross-listed on a 
domestic exchange (the so-called “listing theory”).”  Id. at 176. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that “the ‘listing theory’ is 
irreconcilable with Morrison, when read as a whole.”  Id. at 180.  The 
court articulated that Morrison focuses on purchases and sales of securities 
in the United States and that the Supreme Court “explicitly rejected the 
notion that the “national public interest pertains to transactions conducted 
upon foreign exchanges and markets.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Further, the court noted that Morrison rejected the notion that 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies “to transactions regarding 
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stocked traded in the United States which were effected outside the United 
States.”  Id. at 180. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison “precludes claims brought pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act by purchasers of shares of a foreign issuer on a foreign 
exchange, even if those shares were cross-listed on a United States 
exchange.”  Id. at 176. 
 
Ermini v. Vittori, 758 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether removal of an autistic child from an 
educational program, which would cause him to suffer loss of skills 
associated with his cognitive and emotional abilities, would constitute a 
psychological harm pursuant to 13(b) of the Hague Convention.  Id. at 160. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “Article 13(b) explicitly lists 
‘psychological’ harm and ‘physical’ harm as appropriate harm for 
triggering the Convention’s affirmative defenses.”  Id.  The court also 
noted that the “district court established there was a probability that the 
harm would materialize.”  Id. at 166.  The court reasoned that the harm of 
losing “the ability to develop cognitive, emotional, and relational skills, 
and potentially lead an independent life, if removed from his currently 
therapy and repatriated, establishe[d] harm of a ‘severe magnitude’ 
manifestly sufficient to satisfy the exception.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the child in this case “faced 
a grave risk of harm if removed from his current therapy and returned to 
Italy.”  Id. at 153. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a denial without prejudice in a Hague 
Convention case constitutes an error of law.  Id. at 167. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Convention “stresses the 
importance of deciding matter expeditiously.  Id.  The court further noted 
that the Hague Convention “is not concerned with establishing the person 
to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future, nor 
with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a decision.”  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the Convention did not 
permit denial of the petition without prejudice.”  Id. at 168. 
 
Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors at the N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 
742 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the statute of limitations on a [duty of fair 
representation] claim is tolled during litigation in state court to confirm or 
set aside an arbitration award.”  Id. at 48. 
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ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “equitable tolling of 
limitations periods has been recognized in various contexts where 
pursuing a separate administrative remedy is a precondition to filing suit.”  
Id. at 48.  However, the court noted that in situations where a plaintiff 
pursues parallel avenues of relief, tolling has not applied.  Id. at 49.  The 
court reasoned that tolling was not appropriate because the present case 
did not include a “unitary statutory scheme mandating administrative 
action before [a] suit can be brought in a federal forum’ and ‘[t]he purposes 
of the two avenues of relief differed.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that tolling was not appropriate 
because the conclusion of the lower proceedings was merely “in harmony 
with the salutary policy favoring the prompt resolution of labor disputes” 
rather than administrative proceedings required prior to bringing a 
legitimate claim in federal court, and therefore, because the two avenues 
taken in search of relief were “parallel,” the award of arbitration relief 
must be vacated.  Id. 
 
 
Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 2014 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15758 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a transnational [securities-based] swap 
agreement may be afforded the protection of § 10(b)” of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at *38. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that extending the protection of 
§ 10(b) to transnational securities-based swaps would be an impermissible 
extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 
*6.  The court based its decision on the general principle espoused by the 
Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010) “that, by virtue of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of U.S. statutes, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the basic antifraud provision of the U.S. securities laws, has no 
extraterritorial application, and no civil suit under that section may be 
brought unless predicated on a purchase or sale of a security listed on a 
domestic exchange or on a domestic purchase or sale of another security.”  
Id. at *3.  However, the court declined to adopt a “comprehensive rule or 
set of rules that will govern all future cases to come before this [c]ourt” or 
apply this holding outside the transnational swap agreement context.  Id. 
at *51. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that extending the protection of 
§ 10(b) to transnational securities-based swaps would be an impermissible 
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extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but 
declined to adopt a bright-line rule.  Id. 
 
Price Trucking Corp. v. Norampac Indus., 748 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) “grants the 
subcontractor a right of recovery against the landowner [where the general 
contractor was paid but failed to forward monies to the subcontractor], 
[even though this] effectively requir[es] the landowner to pay twice for the 
same work performed – once to the contractor and once to the 
subcontractor.”  Id. at 77. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that, under CERCLA, landowners 
may pay for cleanups by providing moneys directly to a general contractor, 
even when a subcontractor actually executed the cleanup.  Id. at 86.  The 
court thus found that a subcontractor’s inability to recover the full cost of 
its cleanup “falls outside of Congress’s concern for enacting the statute,” 
owing to the fact that neither CERCLA’s language nor its legislative 
history suggests that the statute eliminates or otherwise limits the common 
law rule “bar[ring] direct recovery for breaches of contract against a party 
not in privity with the claimant” in the waste cleanup context.  Id. at 84–
86. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that CERCLA does not allow a 
subcontractor to sue a landowner to obtain payment for cleanup work the 
subcontractor performed for the landowner where the landowner already 
paid the subcontractor’s general contractor for the work, even though the 
general contractor never forwarded any monies to the subcontractor.  Id. 
at 77. 
 
Stanczyk v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 68 
not only cancels the operation of Rule 54(d) – which entitles a prevailing 
party to costs – but also reverses that rule.”  Id. at 281. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that every court that has addressed 
this question has come to the same conclusion, that “Rule 68 reverses Rule 
54(d) and requires a prevailing plaintiff to pay a defendant post-offer costs 
if the plaintiff’s judgment is less favorable than the unaccepted offer.”  Id.  
The 2nd Circuit relied on prior precedent examining “Rule 68’s plain 
language, purpose, and historical roots,” as well as the uniformity among 
the other circuits that have already reached a conclusion on this issue.  Id.  
The court also noted that by not awarding attorney fees to the prevailing 
plaintiff, this conclusion would not conflict with 42 USCS § 1988.  Id. at 
282. 
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CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that Rule 68 reverses the 
operation of Rule 54(d) by requiring a prevailing plaintiff to pay the 
defendants’ post-offer costs, excluding any attorney fees.  Id. at 281. 
 
United States v. Crandall, 748 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Sixth Amendment requires 
accommodations for defendants with hearing impairments, and if so, what 
are those accommodations?  Id. at 478. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging the 
decades old Supreme Court proposition that “[t]he right of an accused in 
a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity 
to defend against the State’s accusations.”  Id. at 481.  This court noted 
that this right stems from the Compulsory Process and Confrontation 
Clauses, guaranteeing a defendant in a criminal proceeding “a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense,” which means that the 
defendant “must possess sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . .”   Id.  The 
court then analogized the situation of a hearing impaired individual to that 
of an individual requiring a foreign language interpreter.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the right to participate in 
one’s own trial encompasses the right to reasonable accommodations for 
impairments to that participation, including hearing impairments,” but 
limited these accommodations “that are requested by the defendant before 
or during trial, or the need for which is, or should reasonably be, clear or 
obvious to the district judge.”  Id. at 481–82. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13641 
(3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a claim that a school district retaliated against 
a child and/or the child’s parents for enforcing the child’s rights under the 
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-1482,] could be brought under, and remedied by, the IDEA.”  Id. 
at *17. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 1st and 11th Circuits have 
“require[d] IDEA exhaustion [for] retaliation claims . . . .”  Id. at *19.  The 
court reasoned that the plain language of the IDEA allows parents of 
disabled children to bring a complaint “with respect to any matter relating 
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or 
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child . . . ”  Id. 
at *18.  The court posited that the retaliation claims under “the 
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Rehabilitation Act and ADA ‘relate unmistakably’ to the provision of a 
[free and appropriate public education (FAPE)], and are thus subject to the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.”  Id. at *19.  The court reasoned that 
exhaustion develops “the record for review on appeal,” encourages 
“parents and the local school district to work together to formulate an IEP 
for a child’s education,” and allows “the education agencies to apply their 
expertise and correct their own errors.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the plain language and 
structure of the IDEA, in addition to the purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement and the policy concerns supporting it” suggests that 
“retaliation claims related to the enforcement of rights under the IDEA 
must be exhausted before a court may assert subject matter jurisdiction.”  
Id. at *23. 
 
Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: “When a joint authorship claim under the 
Copyright Act arises and accrues?”  Id. at 58. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, when determining when a cause of 
action accrues, it will obey the “discovery rule,” which states that “a claim 
accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered with ‘due 
diligence that his rights had been violated.”  Id. at 70.  The 3rd Circuit 
noted that the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits have adopted an “express 
repudiation rule” which states that “a joint authorship claim arises and an 
author is alerted to the potential violation of his rights when his authorship 
has been expressly repudiated by his co-author.”  Id.  The court determined 
that the discovery rule will this apply “once a plaintiff’s authorship has 
been expressly repudiated” because the plaintiff will only be on notice 
once his rights have been violated.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held “an authorship claim arises and 
accrues when a plaintiff’s authorship has been ‘expressly repudiated.’”  Id. 
at 58. 
QUESTION TWO: “Whether courts have the authority to cancel 
copyright registrations.”  Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court first examined the Copyright Act and 
determined that “there is no statutory authority in the Copyright Act that 
gives courts any general authority to cancel copyright registrations.”  Id. 
at 75.  Next, the court recognized that copyright registration cancellation 
is an administrative function, and as such, is reserved for the Copyright 
Office.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit further noted “the Lanham Act explicitly 
provides courts with the general authority to cancel trademarks” and that 
if Congress’s intent was to provide courts with the same authority 
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regarding copyright registrations, “it could have done so in equally express 
statutory language.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “courts have no authority to 
cancel copyright registrations because there is no statutory indication 
whatsoever that courts have such authority . . . ” and that the power of 
cancellation “resides exclusively with the Copyright Office.”  Id. at 75–
77. 
 
D.E v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16546 (3d Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a party seeking to enforce a favorable decision 
from an administrative due process hearing must exhaust administrative 
remedies before filing suit in a court of law” pursuant to the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)  Id. at *29. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that Congress envisioned that plaintiffs 
would exhaust administrative processes before instituting legal 
proceedings, and, as such, courts should enforce the exhaustion 
requirement.  Id. at *31.  However, the court noted that there are four 
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, where: “(1) exhaustion would 
be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal question; 
(3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; and (4) exhaustion would 
cause severe or irreparable harm.”  Id. at *32.  Further, the court reasoned, 
“administrative exhaustion of a favorable decision is futile and barred by 
the express language of the statute in that only ‘aggrieved parties’ may 
appeal.”  Id. at *34. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “a party seeking to enforce 
a favorable decision from an administrative due process hearing need not 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in a court of law” under 
the IDEA.  Id. 
 
La. Forestry Ass’n v. Sec’y U.S. DOL, 745 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Department of Labor (“DOL”) exceeded 
its authority by enacting a regulation governing the calculation of the 
minimum wage a U.S. employer must offer in order to recruit foreign 
workers under the H-2B visa program.”  Id. at 658. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined both the DOL’s “general 
rulemaking authority in the context of the H-2B program, as well its 
compliance with the requirements” of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) in the 
promulgation of the 2011 Wage Rule.  Id. at 669.  The court began by 
examining the Department of Homeland Security’s interpretation of the 
INA, and reasoned that “Congress endowed the Department of Homeland 
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Security with general authority to administer the nation’s immigration 
laws.”  Id. at 669-70.  After performing a Chevron deference analysis, the 
court concluded that “the 2011 Wage Rule was promulgated pursuant to a 
[lawful] subdelegation of the [Department of Homeland Security’s 
authority to administer the H-2B program.”  Id. at 674–75. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the 2011 Wage Rule was 
issued pursuant to the [Department of Homeland Security’s] permissible 
conditioning of the grant of H-2B petitions on the advice of the 
[Department of Labor] pursuant to the [Department of Homeland 
Security’s] charge from Congress to determine[ ] H-2B visa petitions after 
consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government.” Id. at 675 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the ‘stay-put provision’ of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), “parents are 
eligible for reimbursement for private school costs if they do not file a 
claim seeking payment until after a court has ruled in favor of the school 
district.”  Id. at 115. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted “the stay-put provision itself impliedly 
and necessarily, deems reimbursement for the costs of pendent placement 
in a private school an appropriate remedy.”  Id. at 123.  The court reasoned 
that “there is no separate requirement of a court finding of 
appropriateness,” but that this obligation, instead, arises automatically.  Id.  
The court further noted that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) states, “the child shall 
remain in the current education placement until” the completion of all 
[IDEA] proceedings.  Id.  According to the court, Congress did not intend 
for placement based on an agreement with the State or local education 
agency to be less secure than one based on an IEP.  Id. at 124. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “under the statute and [the] 
court’s precedent” the pendent placement under § 1415(j) remained the 
private school “through at least the conclusion of the proceedings in the 
district court and the school district’s correlative obligation to pay 
for . . . schooling there also remained intact.”  Id. at 125. 
 
Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court’s discretionary remand under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) constitutes an appealable “final 
decision” under 28 U.S.C. §1291.  Id. at 133. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that a remand under the DJA is 
indistinguishable from the remand the Supreme Court considered in 
Quackenbush v. Allstate, 517 U.S. 706 (1996).  Id.  The court noted that 
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in Quackenbush, the Supreme Court found that generally a remand order 
will be appealable “where it effectively puts the litigants out of court so 
that its effect is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state 
court” and when it “conclusively determines an issue that is separate from 
the merits.”  Id. at 133–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
determined that a district court’s discretionary remand under the DJA 
effectively placed the litigants out of court.  Id. at 134.  The court 
concluded that a discretionary remand under the DJA “conclusively 
determines an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, whether the 
District Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over” the declaratory 
judgment action.  Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a remand order following a 
decision to decline jurisdiction under the DJA is a “final decision” under 
§ 1291 and is thus reviewable on appeal.  Id. at 134. 
 
Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether employer intent is necessary to establish a valid 
§ 207(k) work period under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  Id. 
at 185–86. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[t]he text of § 207(k) does not 
specify how an employer establishes a qualifying work period,” and 
[n]othing in the language of the statute requires employers to express their 
intent to qualify for or operate under the exemption.”  Id.  at 186.  The 
court stated that the plain language of the statute “[o]nly requires the 
existence of a qualifying work period.  Nothing more.”  Id.  The court thus 
“declin[ed] to adopt a rule that requires employers to clear a hurdle not 
provided for in the statutory text.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that employers seeking to 
qualify for the § 207(k) exemption need not express an intent to qualify 
for or operate under the exemption, and that employers must only meet the 
factual criteria set forth in § 207(k).  Id. 
 
Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether information that contains omissions, although 
it is accurate, is complete and accurate under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.  Id. at 865. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the “meaning[s] of 
“completeness” and “accuracy” under FCRA” have never been analyzed 
by the 3rd Circuit.  The court stated the well-accepted proposition that 
“factually incorrect information is ‘inaccurate’ for purposes of the FCRA.”  
Id.  The court further reasoned that a jury should decide the question of 
“whether technically accurate information was misleading” in such a 
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manner as to be expected to have an adverse effect on the issue before the 
court.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 4th, 6th, and 9th 
Circuits, and held “that even if the information is technically correct, it 
may nonetheless be inaccurate if, through omission, it  ‘created a 
materially misleading impression.’”  Id. 
 
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Government . . . can have a sufficiently 
important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental 
competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing”.  Id. at 374. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that one of the Government’s important 
interests is to punish those who have committed a crime, and in order to 
carry out this punishment, the defendant must be mentally competent to 
face sentencing.  Id. at 381.  The court noted that defendants have rights 
at sentencing that should be ensured, including the right to allocate, to 
“object to the [pre-sentencing investigation report], to argue for favorable 
sentencing variances and downward departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and to oppose any arguments favoring upward variances or 
departures from the guidelines.”  Id. at 384.  The court concluded that the 
“real conduct” of the defendant is determined at these sentencing, which 
requires that the defendant participate in “sentence proceedings and inform 
his attorney’s actions.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the Government has a 
sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore 
his mental competency, therefore the Government possesses the power to 
forcibly medicate a defendant if the defendant requires medication to be 
fit to stand trial.  Id. at 373. 
 
United States v. Erwin, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16425 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the possibility of de novo resentencing is 
barred by application of the cross-appeal rule, which provides that a party 
aggrieved by a decision of the district court must file an appeal in order to 
receive relief from the decision.”  Id. at *25. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “Congress vested appellate 
jurisdiction in the Courts of Appeals for review of final decisions of the 
district courts.”  Id.  The court further noted that “the same is true of cross-
appellants,” and that a party “who receives all that he has sought generally 
is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief” and therefore cannot 
appeal from that judgment.  Id.  The court concluded that “this requirement 
does not derive from the jurisdictional limitations of Article III, but from 
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statutes granting appellate jurisdiction and the historic practices of the 
appellate courts.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the cross-appeal rule does 
not apply and consequently does not bar the Government from seeking de 
novo resentencing.”  Id. at *25. 
 
United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “one who pleads nolo contendere to an offense 
is thereby ineligible for a reduction in the offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1.”  
Id. at 125. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit recognized that a district court is in the 
unique position to assess the sincerity of a defendant and the court is 
“especially deferential to [its] assessment of whether the defendant 
accepted responsibility.”  Id. at 127. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
One who pleads nolo contendere may be offered a reduction in the offense 
level if the court determines he or she exhibits remorse not unlike that 
communicated by a guilty plea.  Id.  The court further concluded that this 
determination is to take into consideration the totality of the surrounding 
circumstances.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “a nolo contendere plea does 
not automatically preclude a district court from granting such a reduction, 
and that  the court  should heavily defer to the district court’s assessment 
of whether the defendant “adequately accepted responsibility” in 
determining whether the defendant is entitled to an offense reduction.  Id. 
at 125–26. 
 
United States v. McGee, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15604 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) [of C.F.R. 240] exceeds the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rulemaking authority under 
§ 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]?”  Id. at *12. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(2)” 
warrants review “under the familiar two-step Chevron deference 
framework.”  Id. The court concluded that, at Chevron step one, “§ 10(b) 
is ambiguous and expressly delegates broad rulemaking authority to the 
SEC” and gives the SEC “the power to ‘prescribe (regulations) as 
necessary or appropriate’ to prevent the use of ‘manipulative or deceptive 
device(s)” in connection with trading securities.”  Id. at *13.    The court 
then found that, under Chevron step two, Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is based on a 
permissible reading of ‘deceptive device(s)’ under § 10(b).”  Id. at *21.  
While the court noted that they were “not without reservations concerning 
the breadth of misappropriation under Rule 105b-2(b)(2)” they ultimately 
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concluded that “it is for Congress to limit its delegation of authority to the 
SEC or to limit misappropriation by statute.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) warrants 




Austin v. Plumley, 565 Fed.Appx. 175 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Pearce presumption applies to motions 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a).  Id. at 186. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the holding of North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969), is premised upon the idea that 
there is a need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process.  
Austin, 565 Fed.Appx. at 186. In Pearce, the Court dealt with the 
resentencing of a defendant that had successfully attacked his first 
conviction.  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.  The court stated that by applying a 
rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness in the case at bar, it would 
“further the prophylactic function of the [Pearce] presumption.”  Austin, 
565 Fed.Appx. at 189.  The court noted that the prophylactic nature of the 
rule is aimed primarily at protecting future litigants who appeal their 
sentences, and is not necessarily in place to prevent the injustice done in 
any single case, as a “court’s vindictiveness” might cause hesitance for 
defendants contemplating an appeal of their sentence.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the Pearce presumption 
applies to Rule 35(a) motions.  Id. at 190. 
 
Co. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a district court retains jurisdiction to rule on a 
motion to intervene following a notice of appeal.”  Id. at 258. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a majority of circuits, including the 
2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th, have applied a “general jurisdiction-stripping rule to 
hold that an effective notice of appeal deprives a district court of authority 
to entertain a motion to intervene after the court of appeals has assumed 
jurisdiction over the underlying manner.”  Id.  The court concluded that 
there was no reason why a motion to intervene should be “excepted from 
the general rule” that divests the district court with the authority to “rule 
on matters once the case is before the court of appeals.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits 
and held “that an effective notice of appeal divests a district court of 
jurisdiction to entertain an intervention motion.”  Id. at 259. 
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In re Rowe, 750 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, in light of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), a 
bankruptcy court is required, absent extraordinary circumstances, to 
compensate Chapter 7 trustees on a commission basis.”  Id. at 394. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a)(7) to find that the statute imposes a mandatory rule calling for 
trustees to be awarded reasonable compensation on a commission basis, 
based on § 326 of the statute.  Id. at 396.  The court further noted that while 
certain extraordinary circumstances might reduce this commission, such 
circumstances are “rare and unusual” and “include situations such as 
where the trustee’s case administration falls below acceptable standards or 
where it appears a trustee has delegated a substantial portion of his or her 
duties to an attorney or other professional.”  Id. at 397.  Thus, the court 
found that the “starting point for deciding Chapter 7 trustee compensation 
is always the commission rate to which the trustee would normally be 
entitled had no extraordinary circumstances existed:” whether 
extraordinary circumstances reduce the commission should be determined 
after the rate is settled.  Id. at 398–99. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that “absent extraordinary 
circumstances, Chapter 7 trustees must be paid on a commission basis, as 
required by § 330(a)(7).”  Id. at 394. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
Burnett Ranches, Ltd. v. U.S., 753 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[Whether] an otherwise qualified individual who has 
participated in management of the farming operations for not less than five 
years comes within the “Active Participation Exception” embodied in 26 
U.S.C. § 464(c)(2)(A), irrespective of the fact that the legal title of such 
individual’s attributable interest happens to be held in the name of her 
wholly owned S corporation rather than in her own name.”  Id. at 150. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit looked to the plain language of the 
“Active Participation Exception” and determined that because Congress 
has not expressly limited the use of “interest” in the statutory language, 
the word “must be deemed to have been used in its broadest, generic sense, 
with no intention of narrowing the meaning of ‘interest’ to cover only 
technically titled ownership.”  Id. at 149.  The court noted that under 
§ 464(c)(2)(A), active participation in farm management for five years 
qualifies as “any interest in the partnership or enterprise for the exception 
as long as it is attributable to such participation not just interests that are 
legally held or titled, but also indirect or beneficial interests.”  Id.  The 
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court further noted that Congress has not “expressly eliminated an ‘S 
corporation’ from the types of legal entities which [§ 464(c)(2)(A)] 
subjects to farming syndicate status.”  Id.  The court determined that 
Congress “at least implicitly recognized the tax status of S corporations as 
purely flow-through entities,” and therefore, S corporations do not prevent 
active-participation status in a partnership or enterprise “in which the 
interest of the active participant happens to be held in an S corp[oration] 
for some reason unrelated to taxes.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “an otherwise qualified 
individual” who has been an active participant in the management of a 
farming operation for not less than five years falls within the scope of the 
“Active Participation Exception” under § 464(c)(2)(A), notwithstanding 
the fact that the legal title of the individual is held in the name of her S 
corporation.  Id. at 150. 
 
Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15636 (5th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a standard lease agreement requiring 
optometrists to make representations in their leases of the projected 
amount of hours their offices would remain open violated the Texas 
Optometry Act.  Id. at *1. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit found that the plain meaning of the Texas 
Optometry Act expressly prohibits a retailer from “attempting to control 
an optometrist’s manner of practice.”  Id. at *12.  The court based its 
conclusion on § 351.408 of the Act, which defines “control or attempted 
control” as “setting or attempting to influence the . . .  office hours of an 
optometrist.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that because control is not 
limited to “control of the optometrists’ professional (i.e. medical) 
judgment,” and because the plain language of the statute includes attempts 
to control office hours, that a lease agreement requiring optometrists to 
make representations in their leases about their hours violates the Texas 
Optometry Act.  Id. at *8–9. 
 
NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (“TCPA”) is immediately reviewable 
under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 748. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that 
“where the district court’s order is not a final judgment . . . the collateral 
order doctrine can confer limited appellate jurisdiction.”  Id. at 747.  The 
court recognized that in order to be immediately appealed under the 
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collateral order doctrine, “1) the order must conclusively determine the 
disputed question; (2) it must resolve an important issue completely 
separate from the merits of the case; and (3) it must be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Id. at 747.  The court 
found that a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is conclusive 
since it is unlikely to revisit the order; the first requirement is satisfied.  Id. 
at 748.  In addition, the court found that the district court’s order is 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment since the dismissal would 
provide immunity from suit and “an essential part of the defendant’s claim 
is the right to avoid the burden of trial.”  Id. at 750. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear 
the immediate appeal because the “TCPA satisfies all three requirements” 
of the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 748. 
 
Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a conviction under a state statute that does not 
include the exact same elements as the Concealed Substances Act 
(“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), is equal to a felony punishable under the 
CSA, and is therefore treatable as an aggravated felony for immigration 
purposes.  Id. at 628–29. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed the definition of an aggravated 
felony in the context of The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), finding that, “a conviction under state law may qualify,” 
but that a state offense only constitutes a felony under the CSA if “it 
proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.”  Id. at 
628.  The court recognized that in comparing a state statute to the CSA, it 
must evaluate “the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine 
whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.”  
Id. at 628.  The court compared the elements of Florida’s statute on 
possession and sale of controlled substances, to the elements of the CSA 
and found that Florida’s statute did not require the defendant to know that 
the substance was considered a controlled substance.  Id. at 629–30.  The 
court concluded that the “least of the acts criminalized” by the Florida 
statute does not violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), because “although a person 
could be convicted under the Florida statute without any knowledge of the 
illicit nature of the substance he possesses, the same person could not be 
convicted of drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).”  Id. at 631. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a conviction under a state 
drug trafficking statute that does not include the elements of the CSA will 
not qualify as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.  Id. at 631. 
 
Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Mfg. Co., 744 F.3d 944 (5th Cir. 2014) 
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QUESTION: Whether the Texas “relation back statute” or Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c) governs when determining the timeliness of a plaintiff’s 
federal claims made in an amended state court filing.  Id. at 946. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that the 6th and 9th Circuits have 
addressed this issue, and concluded that analogous state rules, not Rule 
15(c), apply.  Id. at 946.  The Court agreed with this application, and 
recognized that Federal Rules “do not provide for retroactive application 
to the procedural aspects of a case that occurred in state court prior to 
removal to federal court.”  Id.  Further, the 5th Circuit noted that it has 
applied state rules to analogous circumstances, in order to “determine the 
implications of events that occurred while” a case was pending before a 
state court.  Id. at 947. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the Texas statute applied to 
the determination of “whether [the defendant’s] amended petition filed in 
state court relates back to the date of his original petition,” and concluded 
that the “amended petition did not relate back under the Texas statute” 
because the claims asserted in the original petition were barred.  Id. at 947. 
 
United States ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, 746 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the district court properly construed the 
False Claims Act (“FCA”) to require a pending qui tam action in order for 
another proceeding to constitute an alternate remedy” pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5).  Id. at 161. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that by way of a qui tam action, a 
private party may bring a civil action for violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 on 
behalf of the United States Government.  Id. at 160. The 5th Circuit 
reasoned that “the Government may elect to pursue its claim through an 
alternate remedy available to the Government.”  Id.  The court noted that 
the language of the statute must be analyzed first to determine the plain 
meaning of the statute.  Id. at 161.  The court observed, in analyzing the 
plain language of the statute, that for any proceeding to be “alternate,” two 
or more choices must have existed at the time of the Government’s 
election of the alternate remedy.  Thus, the court concluded that a qui tam 
proceeding must be in existence at the time of the said election.  Id. at 161. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that if a qui tam action is filed 
subsequent to the Government’s criminal prosecution, the Government’s 
criminal proceeding for prosecution of § 3729 violators is not an alternate 
remedy for relators to be granted relief.  Id. at 161. 
 
United States v. Mackay, 757 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a presentence report (“PSR”) is “part of the 
record” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. Id. at 196. 
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ANALYSIS:   The court conducted a statutory analysis and determined 
that a PSR is “of like kind or character” to judgments and orders, both of 
which are “part of the record” under Rule 36.   Id. at 198.  The court noted 
that “like an order, the PSR contains ‘directions or instruction’ about the 
defendant’s sentence.”  Id.  The court also found that, akin to a judgment, 
the “PSR determines the rights and obligations of the defendant going 
forward.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a PSR is “a part of the 
record” because the PSR affects the rights and obligations of the defendant 
as well as being “of like kind or character as a ‘judgment’ or ‘order’ and 
that it is embraced by the terms ‘other part of the record’ as used in Rule 
36.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether [18 U.SC]. § 1591(a) requires that a defendant 
know that his conduct is in or affects interstate commerce.”  Id. at 264. 
ANALYSIS: The Court first investigated the meaning of “knowingly” 
by looking at Flores–Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), 
which held that “knowingly” applies to each element of the criminal 
statute and that “as a matter of ordinary English grammar, it seems natural 
to read the statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the subsequently 
listed elements of the crime.”  Id.  The court relied on the reasoning in 
Flores–Figueroa to declare that the interstate nexus element “is not related 
to the direct object of the transitive verbs ‘recruits, entices, harbors, 
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means.’”   Id. at 265.  
The court noted that “[a] person” is the direct object in the statute; 
“however, it is not the person who must be in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, but rather that it is the actions described by the 
transitive verbs that must occur in, or affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce.”  Id.  The court thus concluded that “the interstate nexus 
element is in essence an adverbial phrase modifying the transitive verb” 
and Flores–Figueroa does not address this issue. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the application of 




Bickley v. Dish Network, LLC, 751 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a satellite television provider had a “legitimate 
business need” to request a consumer credit report under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).  Id. at 730–31. 
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ANALYSIS: The court looks at § 1681(b), which allows for the 
furnishing of a consumer report to an individual “that it has reason to 
believe will use the information for one of several permissible purposes,” 
which are detailed in the statute.  Id. at 730.  One of those permissible 
purposes arises when a person has a “legitimate business need for the 
information . . . in connection with a business transaction that is initiated 
by the consumer.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted 
that case law clearly articulates that a company has a “‘legitimate business 
need’ when it assesses a consumer’s eligibility for a business service.”  Id. 
at 731.  The court found that at the time the satellite provider allegedly 
accessed the consumer’s credit report, “it believed that [the consumer] was 
a potential customer,” and thus had a need to “clarify the consumer’s 
identity and to ascertain his eligibility for service . . . .”  Id. at 732. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the satellite provider had a 
“legitimate business need” to request the consumer report, because it 
believed that the consumer was a potential customer.  Id. 
 
F.H. v. Memphis City Schs., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17102 (6th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a claim of breach of a settlement agreement 
must be exhausted before bringing a civil suit to enforce rights pursuant to 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).  Id. at *8. 
ANALYSIS: The court relied on the 2004 Amendments to the IDEA 
that state “in the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the complaint 
at a [resolution session], the parties shall execute a legally binding 
agreement that is . . . enforceable in any State court of competent 
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.”  Id.  The court noted 
that the terms of a settlement agreement reached at a resolution session are 
enforceable in state and federal courts, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii).  Id. at *8–*9.  The court further reasoned that the 2004 
Amendments to IDEA, coupled with the plain language of the settlement 
agreement at issue here, provided for an enforceable agreement.  Id. at *9. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that because a settlement 
agreement was enforceable in courts, “that the breach of contract claim 
does not require administrative exhaustion.”  Id. 
 
Hescott v City of Saginaw, 757 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a successful plaintiff is required to pay the 
defendant’s post-offer attorney’s fees pursuant to the fee-shifting statutes 
contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.  Id. at 520. 
  ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that although the award of costs 
under Rule 68 can be read as including attorney’s fees, these costs must 
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be “properly awardable.”  Id. at 528.  The court noted that, pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, only a prevailing party can recover attorney’s fees.  Id. at 
529.  The court found that a party must first prevail and then prove that the 
action was “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation” to be awarded 
attorney’s fees.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
concluded that a defendant must be the prevailing party in order to receive 
attorney’s fees.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit reasoned that “because § 1988 is not 
a ″two-way fee-shifting statute,″ Rule 68 cannot force a prevailing civil-
rights plaintiff to pay a defendant’s post-offer attorneys’ fees.”  Id. at 528. 
 
Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC, 747 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the “strong presumption in favor of arbitration 
applies post-expiration when an arbitration clause is not listed in a survival 
clause.”  Id. at 396. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “where ambiguity in agreements 
involving arbitration exists . . . the strong presumption in favor of 
arbitration applies.”  Id. at 396–97.  The court noted that district courts in 
the 7th and 8th Circuits have applied the presumption in favor of 
arbitration where “the agreement was ambiguous on the issue of whether 
the arbitration clause survived.”  Id. at 397.  The 6th Circuit further 
recognized that one of its district courts found that there were ambiguities 
in the arbitration clause and held that “considering the contract as a 
whole . . . is the correct way to determine whether the parties 
unambiguously intended for the arbitration clause to expire with the 
contract.”  Id. at 397–98. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the strong presumption in 
favor of arbitration controls where there is ambiguity in a contract, but 
omission of an arbitration clause from a survival clause could satisfy the 
“clear implication” standard, where it was the intent of the parties for the 
arbitration clause not to survive the termination of the contract.  Id. at 398. 
 
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, bars the state-law defamation claims” of a 
person who was the “unwelcome subject” of several posts uploaded on a 
popular website.  Id. at 401. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned, “Congress envisioned an 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open internet.”  Id. at 415.  The court 
rejected application of an encouragement theory of “development,” as 
such a theory would “inflate the meaning of ‘development’ to the point of 
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eclipsing the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress 
established.”  Id. at 414.  The court similarly rejected the application of an 
adoption or ratification theory, noting that, “[a] website operator cannot be 
responsible for what makes another party’s statement actionable by 
commenting on that statement post hoc.”  Id. at 415.  The court instead 
decided that a material contribution measure of “development,” as 
expressed by the 9th Circuit, was more appropriate in the given 
circumstances.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that an online publisher was not 
liable when “that publisher did not materially contribute to the tortious 
content.”  Id. at 417. 
 
McCarthy v. Ameritech Publishing, Inc., 763 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the monetary award directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(c)(2) includes the cost of preparing the fee application for such an 
award. Id. at 494. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that the 8th Circuit considered this 
issue and stated that “the magistrate’s scrutiny on remand should extend 
also to hours reasonably spent by a Booker’s local counsel in seeking the 
discovery sanctions.”  Id. 493.  The court also noted that the 7th Circuit 
awarded attorneys fees under Rule 37(c)(2) “for the time expended by the 
defendant’s in filing and briefing their motion for attorney’s fees.”  Id.  
The court then examined other provisions of Rule 37, as well as Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 36, and found that it “would be incongruous to 
interpret Rule 37(c)(2) to bar district courts from awarding reasonable fees 
and expenses associated with the preparation and presentation of fee 
applications.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that monetary awards under Rule 
37(c)(2) include all reasonable costs, including “reasonably attorney’s fees 
and costs associated with the preparation and presentation of the fee 
application.”  Id. at 488. 
 
Plymouth Park Tax Servs., LLC v. Bowers (In re Bowers), 759 F.3d 621 
(6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a debtor, during the pendency of a bankruptcy 
proceeding to a tax certificate holder, must pay the interest rate denoted 
on the face of the tax certificate as the “certificate rate of interest,” 0.25%, 
or the interest rate pursuant to § 5721.38 (2010) of the Ohio Revised Code, 
18%.  Id. at 623. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that the “Ohio Revised Code’s tax 
certificate provisions specifically address situations where delinquent 
taxpayers file for bankruptcy protection.”  Id. at 626.  Further, the court 
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determined that there is no statutory authority or case law that mandates 
that “the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose triggers an early expiration 
of the six year period.”  Id. at 627. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that Ohio Revised Code 
§ 5721.37(A)(3)(b) applied, and the “0.25% interest rate on the face of the 
tax certificate is the ‘certificate rate of interest’ and continues to accrue 
during the extension of time because of the bankruptcy filing.  Id. at 628. 
 
RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 
F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: “Whether Regulation B’s definition of ‘applicant,’ 
which differs from the definition in Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(“ECOA”), is entitled to deference such that guarantors may raise ECOA 
claims.”  Id. at 384. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the ECOA defines an applicant as 
“any person who applies to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, 
or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an 
existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established 
credit limit.”  Id.  The court noted that this definition “does not overtly 
include guarantors,” but “Regulation B’s definition of applicant does for 
the purpose of enforcing spouse-grantor rule.”  Id.  The court examined 
the words “applies” and “credit,” and determined that ECOA’s definition 
was ambiguous since “it could be read to include third parties who do not 
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves 
–a category that includes guarantors.”  Id. at 384–85. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that in light of legislative silence, 
and proper agency construction, regulation B’s classification of 
‘applicant’ constitutes a valid interpretation of the statutory definition, 
thus allowing a guarantor to seek relief for spouse-guarantor rule 
violations.  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether “a spouse-guarantor can assert a violation 
of Regulation B–and therefore of ECOA–as an affirmative defense.”  Id. 
at 384. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that violations of the ECOA can be 
asserted as: (1) a claim or counterclaim (2) a defense of recoupment or (3) 
an affirmative defense of illegality.  Id. at 387.  The court noted that the 
defense of recoupment “allows a defendant to defend against a claim by 
asserting–up to the amount of the claim–the defendant’s own claim against 
the plaintiff growing out of the same transaction.”  Id.  The court reasoned 
that, generally, defendants are allowed to “raise an affirmative claim as a 
defense of recoupment, absent the clearest congressional language to the 
contrary.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court found nothing 
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in the statute that would “deny defendants the ability to assert a violation 
as recoupment defense” and “Congress has explicitly granted courts the 
ability to craft appropriate equitable remedies for ECOA violations.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a violation of ECOA and 
Regulation B can be raised as an affirmative defense of recoupment.  Id. 
 
T.S v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 qualified-immunity 
case, [officials may] benefit from a subsequent Supreme Court case that 
would cause a reasonable official to have at least a good-faith doubt that a 
given practice is prohibited.”  Id. at 637. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that “the 
touchstone of qualified immunity in general, and the clearly-established-
law inquiry in particular, is objective good faith.”  Id. at 637.  The court 
reasoned that a grant of immunization from suit would incentivize 
government officials to pursue their duties “with the zeal and decisiveness 
required by the public good.”  Id.  The court also noted that while the 2nd 
and the 8th Circuits have previously addressed the issue, the facts of each 
were factually distinguishable.  Id. at 640. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not meet 
“their burden of demonstrating that every reasonable official in June 2009 
would have known that conducting a suspicionless strip search of a 
juvenile detainee during his or her intake into a detention facility violated 
the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 640. 
 
United States v. Morgan, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13133 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which proscribes the 
use and possession of a firearm during and in relation to the commission 
of a drug trafficking offense, “authorizes [only] fixed-term minimum 
sentences or whether it may also authorize a life sentence.”  Id. at *22. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court has expressed 
that the “starting point” of statutory construction cases begin with “the 
language employed by Congress.”  Id.  The court articulated that “the 
language employed [in the statute] establish[ed] a floor of ten years’ 
imprisonment, leaving open sentences above that floor.  Id. at *23.  The 
court also found that the legislative history supported their reading of the 
statute.  Id.  The court further explained that it was guided by the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncements in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 
(2013). 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[t]he statutory maximum 
permitted under § 924(c)(1)(A) is a life sentence.”  Id. at *23–*24. 
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the abrogation of sovereign immunity with 
respect to 11 U.S.C. § 544 allows a debtor in possession to bring a state-
law fraudulent-transfer suit against the federal government, despite that 
sovereign immunity would bar a regular creditor from doing so outside of 
the bankruptcy realm.  Id. at 746. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit disagreed with district courts and 
bankruptcy courts, stating that those decisions focused too narrowly on the 
language in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1) and largely disregarded § 544(b)(1)’s 
actual-creditor requirement.  Id. at 748.  The court explained that § 544(b) 
requires a showing of a creditor “who could use a state’s applicable law to 
recover the payment from the IRS.”  Id. at 747 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court noted that when no such creditor exists, the trustee 
cannot bring the claim.  Id.  The court opined that “because no unsecured 
creditor could obtain relief against the United States using the Illinois 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,” a debtor’s tax payment is “not 
‘voidable under applicable law’ within the meaning of § 544(b)(1).”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that a debtor acting with the 
state-law avoidance powers of an unsecured creditor does not have a viable 
cause of action to avoid a tax when the substantive requirements of 
§ 544(b)(1) are unambiguous.  Id. at 751. 
 
United States v. Perry, 743 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a defendant’s past time served due to a prior 
revocation of his supervised release should count towards and so limit the 
maximum sentence the district court can impose for a subsequent violation 
of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).”  Id. at 241. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), 
“[i]f a defendant required to register as a sexual offender under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) commits any 
criminal offense . . . the court shall revoke the term of the supervised 
release” and require the defendant to be imprisoned for not less than five 
years.  Id. at 240–41.  The court observed that the 2nd, 5th, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits have determined that the statutory language does not require 
courts to aggregate time served as a result of violation of supervised 
released terms.  The court reasoned that the defendant may be required to 
serve the maximum, five years, for each subsequent violation of his release 
terms.  Id. at 242.  The court further noted that, as a result of statutory 
construction and interpretation, the addition of the phrase “on any such 
revocation” to § 3583(e) demonstrates that the Court need not aggregate 
time served for each violation of release terms.  Id. at 241. 
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CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the statutory maximum 
imposed on repeat offenders is not altered by a defendant’s prior time 
served for a previous violation of his supervised release, and previous time 
served for violations of supervised release need not be aggregated.  Id. at 
242. 
 
United States v. Pollock, 757 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “possession of a specific firearm is an element 
of a felon in possession charge” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Id. at 588. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 1st Circuit determined that 
“possession of a specific firearm was not an element of the offense.”  Id. 
at 587. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit in finding that the 
“language and history of the statute reflects the desire of Congress to keep 
any firearm out of the hand of convicted felons, regardless of the gun 
type.”  Id.  The 7th Circuit concurred with the 1st Circuit’s conclusion that 
there is the absence of “any legal tradition that sheds light on the question 
before us.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit concluded that “the particular firearm 
possessed is not an element of the crime under § 922(g), but instead the 
means used to satisfy the element of ‘any firearm.’”  Id. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
Becker v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 120, 742 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the statute of limitations on a breach of fair 
representation cause of action begins to accrue on the date of the alleged 
breach or on the date of the arbitration award.  Id. at 333. 
ANALYSIS: The court found it important that the plaintiff’s 
complaint involved the defendant’s handling of the Facility Closure 
Agreement (“FCA”).  Id. at 334.  The court noted that during prior 
proceedings to remedy the dispute, an “arbitrator was involved in the 
collective bargaining agreement.”  Id.  The court concluded that it was 
evident that the defendant was not attempting to “remedy the breach of its 
duty of fair representation in these negotiations regarding the [FCA] as a 
part of the arbitration proceedings . . . ”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that a plaintiff’s cause of action 
begins to accrue at the moment “[he] should reasonably have known of the 
union’s alleged breach.”  Id. at 335. 
 
Hammer v. Sam’s East Inc., 754 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2014) 
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QUESTION: Whether the Article III requirement of an actual or 
threatened injury can exist solely by the invasion of a statute creating legal 
rights.  Id. at 498. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the issue of whether invasion of a 
legal right created by Congress can satisfy the actual injury requirement is 
not a novel principle in the law of standing.  Id.  The 8th Circuit found that 
Congress in enacting a statute is giving an individual a legal right, and 
invasion of this right is an “actual injury.”  Id.  “It is of no consequence 
that appellant’s injury is dependent on the existence of a statute.”  Id. at 
498–99.  The court found further support from the decisions of its sister 
circuits, specifically the 9th Circuit, which found there to be Article III 
standing due to the alleged violation of statutory rights.  Id. at 500. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that suffering an “actual, 
individualized invasion of statutory right,” satisfied the “injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III standing.”  Id. at 499. 
 
 
Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (In re LGI Energy Solutions, 
Inc.), 746 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) “such creditor” language 
“must in all circumstances be construed as limiting subsequent new value 
to that personally provided by the creditor [whom] the trustee elects to sue 
to recover the preferential transfer.”  Id. at 352–356. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit first noted that case law cited in support 
of the limitation was only persuasive authority, and that other persuasive 
authority on the topic contradicts the limitation proposition.  Id. at 354–
55.  However, the court recognized that the case law only stated that a 
“preferred creditor cannot offset subsequent new value provided by a non-
preferred creditor[,]” but this was not relevant to the issue before the court 
because “both the utility customers and the utilities benefited from 
[trustee]’s preferential transfers to [said] utilities.”  Id. at 354-55.  The 8th 
Circuit reasoned that other federal circuit courts have also considered and 
rejected the proposition mentioned above, in accordance with 
§ 547(c)(4)’s goal of “encourag[ing] creditors to deal with troubled 
businesses.”  Id at 355–56. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “in three-party relationships 
where the debtor’s preferential transfer to a third party benefits the 
debtor’s primary creditor, new value (either contemporaneous or 
subsequent) can come from the primary creditor, even if the third party is 
a creditor in its own right and is the only defendant against whom the 
debtor has asserted a claim of preference liability.”  Id. at 356. 
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United States v. Emly, 747 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) ”permits a charge 
for each [child pornography] matter possessed in violation of the statute.”  
Id. at 977. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit began by noting that it has previously 
suggested that the language “1 or more” in § 2252(a)(4)(B) “manifests 
Congress’ intent to include multiple matters in a single unit of 
prosecution.”  Id. at 977.  The court recognized that under subsection 
(a)(5)(B) of the statute, the 8th Circuit has previous allowed for a 
conviction on multiple counts of child pornography.  Id.  However, the 8th 
Circuit explicitly distinguished the language of (a)(5)(B) from that of 
(a)(4)(B), noting that the words “any” in the former carries a different 
meaning from “1 or more” in the latter.  Id. at 978. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the defendant’s three 
possession counts of child pornography were “multiplicitous,” and only 




Asarco, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16614 (9th 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether, under Rule 15 (c), “an amended pleading 
relates back if it includes allegations that were expressly disclaimed in the 
original pleading.”  Id. at *10. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the relation back doctrine is to 
be liberally applied so that parties can limit their initial pleadings to claims 
and defenses with evidentiary support.  Id. at *14.  The court noted that 
parties should be able to amend their pleadings if new facts are discovered 
after further investigation and discovery.  Id.  The court further noted that 
Rule 15 only requires that “a party be notified of litigation concerning a 
particular transaction or occurrence” and not the exact scope of relief 
sought.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a plaintiff need only plead 
the general conduct, transaction, or occurrence to preserve its claims 
against a defendant.  Id. 
 
Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
“must consider changed country conditions” when considering a “changed 
conditions exception” for untimely motions to reopen removal 
proceedings, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   Id. at 1037. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 6th, 7th and 11th Circuits have 
“each determined that the BIA must consider changed country conditions 
as they relate to a petitioner’s change in personal circumstances.”  Id.  This 
case presented the 9th Circuit with the opportunity to agree with the 
reasoning of its sister courts, which have reasoned that a “purely personal 
change in circumstances” does not warrant the reopening of an untimely 
motion, but that “separate but simultaneous changes in personal 
circumstances and country conditions” may permit a grant of a motion to 
reopen removal proceedings.  Id. at 1038 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined its sister circuits and held that 
when considering an untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings 
under the changed conditions exception, “the BIA must consider changed 
country conditions as they relate to a petitioner’s change in personal 
circumstances.”  Id. at 1037. 
 
Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court’s decision to abstain a county 
court from providing same day access to complaints was a violation of a 
news wire service’s First Amendment right of access.  Id. at 788. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that this case presented the “same 
essential concerns that have compelled us to reject Pullman abstention in 
every First Amendment case except one that was uniquely postured.”  Id. 
at 789.  The court reasoned “the right of access is ‘necessary to the 
enjoyment’ of the right to free speech.”  Id.  The court further reasoned 
that the scope of the news wire service right was of first impression and a 
matter of “particular federal concern” that disconnected the case from the 
territory of “sensitive” state issues that federal courts would not address.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that given the importance of the 
First Amendment issues the “district court lacked the discretion to abstain 
under the Pullman doctrine.”  Id. 
 
Family PAC v. Ferguson, 745 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether costs under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 39 “include attorney’s fees recoverable as part of costs 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and similar statutes.”  Id. at 1262. 
ANALYSIS: Although Rule 39 fails to define “costs,” the court 
determined that “Rule 39(e) specifically enumerates the costs on appeal 
that may be taxed in the district court, and the advisory committee’s note 
cites 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as the statutory authority for the rule.”  Id. at 1263.  
The court further determined that Rule 39(e) only provides for 
administrative costs, such as the cost of filing for notice of appeal, and not 
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for attorney’s fees.  Id. at 1266.  However, the court noted that the advisory 
notes for the statute reference § 1920, which only lists administrative fees 
and not attorney’s fees.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that costs under Rule 39 did not 
include attorney’s fees recoverable under § 1988 and other similar statutes.  
Id. at 1262. 
 
Gillings v. Time Warner Cable LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13852 (9th 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether California courts follow the de minimis 
doctrine as a defense to a wage and hour claim.  Id. at *3. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that “the California Supreme Court 
has never ruled on the applicability of the de minimis doctrine to California 
wage claims,” and determined it “must predict how it would answer the 
question.”  Id.  The court pointed to the fact that the California Court of 
Appeals has applied this federal de minimis standard to a state wage claim 
in a previous case.  Id.  Furthermore, the court could find no Court of 
Appeals case refusing to apply the de minimis doctrine and the 
Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual issued by California’s 
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement supports using the standard.  Id. 
at *4.  The court concluded that it would need to analyze two factors when 
applying the de minimis doctrine — “the practical administrative difficulty 
of recording the additional time . . . and the regularity of the additional 
work” and concluded these two factors may prevent the defendant from 
ultimately prevailing on the de minimis doctrine.  Id. at *6–7. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that California courts should 
follow the de minimis doctrine as a defense in a California wage and hour 
claim but that the employer was not entitled to summary judgment using 
the doctrine.  Id. at *9. 
 
G. M. v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13766 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “the School District violated its child find 
duties” or failed to provide a Free and Appropriate Public Education 
(“FAPE”) with respect to a student.  Id. at *4. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “the district court did not err in 
concluding that the School District complied with its child find duty with 
respect to Student because [the school] took steps to ‘identify, locate, and 
evaluate’” the student.  Id. at *2.  The court further reasoned that the school 
district had provided a FAPE to the student because the school had drafted 
an individualized education plan (“IEP”) “reasonably calculated to confer 
an educational benefit on the child.”  Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks 
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omitted).  The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the IEP 
was imperfect and the student’s school counselor was aware that the 
student had been previously diagnosed with a major depressive disorder.  
Id. The court, however, declined to articulate a test “for when the child 
find obligation is triggered.”  Id. at *4 n.1. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the School District did not 
violate its child find duties or FAPE obligations with respect to the student 
in question and remanded to the district court to determine whether the 
School District should have been awarded attorney’s fees.  Id. at *4. 
 
Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Montreal Convention’s Article 35(1) 
strictures “apply equally to a claim which had not yet accrued at the time 
that the Convention’s two-year limitations period was triggered.”  Id. at 
1126. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit determined that international passengers 
suing airline carriers for damages are governed exclusively by the 
Convention.  Id. at 1127.  The court determined that Article 35(1) 
eliminates claims brought outside “a period of two years, reckoned from 
the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft 
ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage stopped.”  Id. 
at 1127–28.  In addition, the court noted that Article 29 further limits 
damages claims by mandating that “any action for damages, however 
founded, . . . be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability 
as are set out in this Convention.”  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that a 
reading Articles 35(1) and 29 clearly leaves no room for extending the 
statute of limitations on a wrongful death claim, even when the death 
occurs after limitations period started.  Id. at 1128–29. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “damages [claims] based on an 
injury incurred aboard an international flight must be filed within two 
years of the date upon which the aircraft arrived at its destination,” i.e. 
within the limitations period, or those claims will be eliminated.  Id. at 
1132. 
 
Technica LLC ex rel. United States v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 749 F.3d 
1149 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether California’s contractor’s licensing law 
restricts ‘the substance of the rights’ afforded to [subcontractors] under the 
Miller Act,” found at 40 U.S.C. § 3131-3134.  Id. at 1152. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that the Miller Act is remedial in 
nature and should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of 
“protect[ing] those whose labor and materials go into public projects.”  Id. 
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at 1152.  The court also noted that the Miller Act extends explicitly to 
subcontractors.  Id.  The court then articulated that because the Miller Act 
“provides a federal cause of action, the scope of the remedy as well as the 
substance of the rights created thereby is a matter of federal not state law.”  
Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the court found that state 
law should not restrict the substance of rights afforded to subcontractors 
under the Miller Act.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined the 8th and 10th circuits and 
held that the absence of state licensure did not bar suit by a subcontractor 
under the Miller Act. Id. at 1152. 
 
United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a change in circumstances is required for a 
district court to modify conditions of a criminal defendant’s supervised 
release” from prison, pursuant to U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).  Id. at 949. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit recognized that the 8th and 10th Circuits 
have previously “ruled that a change in circumstances is not required for 
a district court” to make modifications to the conditions of a supervised 
release.  Id.  The court agreed with these circuits, and refused to read a 
“changed circumstances” requirement into § 3583(e)(2).  Id. at 950.  The 
court noted that the text of § 3583(e)(2) allows a district court to modify 
such conditions “at any time prior to the expiration or termination” of the 
supervised release term.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “a district court can modify 
a defendant’s conditions of supervised release . . . even absent a showing 
of changed circumstances.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Ezeta, 752 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether 20 U.S.C. §1097(a) requires, as an element of 
the offense, a defendant to personally receive or exercise control over 
federally insured funds to constitute financial aid fraud.  Id. at 1183. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the statutory language of § 1097(a) 
and determined that it “extends to knowingly and willfully causing the 
funds to be disbursed to a third party by fraud, false statement, or forgery.”  
Id. at 1184–85.  The court further stated that due to the plain meaning of 
“obtain,” coupled with the intent of Congress for the statute to “have a 
broad reach,” the statute covers “the act of taking money from the 
government via false statements and causing it to be disbursed to others.”  
Id. at 1185.  The court reasoned that a person does not need to receive the 
payment of federal funds obtained by fraud as long as that person 
benefitted from the fraud in some way.  Id. at 1186. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “exercising personal 
dominion or control over the federally insured funds is not an element of 
financial aid fraud under the ‘knowingly and willfully . . . obtain[ing] by 
fraud [or] false statement’ language” of § 1097(a).  Id. 
 
United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the generic federal definition of statutory rape 
has, as an element, a four-year age difference . . . ”  Id. at 904. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a four-year age difference is an 
element of the generic offense of statutory rape.”  Id.  The court 
determined that the “ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the 
term ‘minor’ in the context of statutory rape law was a person under 
sixteen years of age,” but the age difference was never considered.  Id. at 
905.  The court noted that “forty-one states have an age difference in some 
of their statutory rape laws” and further recognized that thirty-two of those 
states “require an age difference of four years or more.”  Id. at 906.  The 
court additionally noted that some states require an even larger age gap.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that when the state statutory rape 
laws, the Model Penal Code, and the federal law are viewed together, they 
support the “conclusion that statutory rape is ordinarily, contemporarily, 
and commonly understood to include as an element a four-year age 
difference between the victim and the defendant.”  Id. at 909. 
 
United States v. Hui Hsiung, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13051 (9th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether, in a criminal action for antitrust violation 
brought under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., “the rule of reason 
applies to [a] price-fixing conspiracy” as opposed to a per se analysis, 
when the proscribed conduct occurred in another country.  Id. at *6, *25–
*26. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court has stated that 
“horizontal price-fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 
*24–*25.  The court further noted that the case “center[ed] on a classic 
horizontal price-fixing scheme [traditionally] subject to the per se rule” Id. 
at *29.  However, the court recognized that its precedent in Metro Indus. 
v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996), was ambiguous and clashed 
“with the well established tradition of analyzing price fixing under the per 
se rule.” Hui Hsiung, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13051 at *26.  According to 
the court, “[i]nvoking the language in Metro Industries to suggest that 
price-fixing cases involving foreign conduct always should be analyzed 
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under the rule of reason is clearly irreconcilable with Supreme Court 
precedent.” 
CONCLUSION: Thus, the 9th Circuit held that “[t]he district court 
was bound to apply the per se rule and appropriately rejected the rule of 
reason defense.”  Id. at *30. 
QUESTION TWO: “Whether the [Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”),15 U.S.C. § 6a,] affects the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the district court or if, on the other hand, it relates to 
the scope of coverage of the antitrust laws.”  Id. at *32–*33. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court “has made a 
point of distinguishing between a true jurisdictional limitation and a merits 
determination.”  Id. at *34.  The court further noted that the other circuits 
have found that the FTAIA is not a jurisdictional limit on the power of 
federal courts.  Id. at *36.  The court reasoned that the FTAIA “provides 
substantive elements under the Sherman Act in cases involving nonimport 
trade with foreign nations.”  Id. at *36–*37. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the FTAIA is not a subject-
matter jurisdiction limitation on the power of the federal courts but a 
component of the merits of a Sherman Act claim involving nonimport 
trade or commerce with foreign nations.”  Id. at *33. 
QUESTION THREE: “Whether the fine [pursuant to the Alternative 
Fine Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d),] was improper because it was based on 
the collective gains to all members of the conspiracy rather than the gains 
to AUO alone.”  Id. at *57–*58. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that this was “an issue of statutory 
interpretation.”  Id. at *58. The court noted that there was no case to 
support a contrary reading of the statute as it “unambiguously permits a 
‘gross gains’ calculation based on the gain attributable to the entire 
conspiracy.”  Id. at *59. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[t]he unambiguous 
language of the Alternative Fine Statute permitted the district court to 
impose the [] fine based on the gross gains to all the coconspirators.”  Id. 
at *60. 
QUESTION FOUR: “Whether the district court, in not imposing joint 
and several liability, erred by failing to adhere to the ‘one recovery’ rule 
and failing to take into account any fines paid by AUO’s coconspirators.”  
Id. at *58. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that there was no support for the 
proposition that § 3571(d) of the Alternative Fine Statute incorporates 
principles of joint and several liability.  Id. at *60.  The court determined 
that “two of the cited cases establish that joint and several liability is an 
option available to a sentencing court.” Id. (emphasis added).  Further, the 
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court noted that “[t]he other cases, which address the imposition of civil 
penalties in RICO prosecutions and civil asset forfeiture, [were] similarly 
inapposite because the purpose of criminal fines is to punish the offender, 
not  to compensate a victim or disgorge ill-gotten gains.”  Id. at *60–*61. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the Alternative Fine Statute 
does not require joint and several liability when imposing a fine.  Id. at 
*61. 
 
United States v. IMM, 747 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “the requirement to certify a substantial federal 
interest is an independent requirement that applies to each of the bases for 
jurisdiction set forth in [18 U.S.] § 5032 or is required only when the 
government asserts jurisdiction under this statute’s third provision.”  Id. at 
762. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that legislative history demonstrated 
that “Congress intended the substantial Federal interest requirement to 
apply to . . . only the third basis for jurisdiction under § 5032.”  Id. at 763. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that Congress inserted 
both the third provision of § 5032 and the language “substantial Federal 
interest” together and that the Senate report explained that the third 
provision was “meant to give the federal government power to retain 
jurisdiction even when a state was willing to assume jurisdiction in certain 
felony cases.” Id.  Further, the court reasoned that the Senate report did 
not discuss applying this new “substantial federal interest” requirement to 
the first and second provisions of § 5032.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the requirement that the 
government certify a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense 
to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction applies only to the third 
provision of § 5032.”  Id. at 764 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
United States v. Williams, 741 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W[hether an Alford plea entered in Washington is 
legally sufficient by itself to warrant a finding that a person on supervised 
release violated the probation against committing a new state crime . . . .”  
Id. at 1059. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit recognized that it previously determined 
that the “effect of a nolo contendere plea in a subsequent criminal trial 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior crime’s commission 
as an element of a new charge . . . ” and that this logic applied to the case 
at bar.  Id.  Further, the court noted that, like a nolo contendere plea, an 
Alford plea is not treated “as probative evidence of the commission of a 
crime” in Washington.  Id. at 1060.  Lastly, the court recognized that its 
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previous case law distinguishes the commission of a crime from the 
conviction of a crime.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “an Alford plea is insufficient 
evidence to prove commission of a state crime for the purposes of a federal 
supervised release violation” in light of the state itself not treating the 
Alford plea as “sufficiently probative of the fact that the defendant actually 
committed the acts constituting the crime or crimes of conviction.”  Id. at 
1061. 
 
Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 763 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the “prejudgment interest in a Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the rate that applies 
to all civil cases in federal district courts, or 26 U.S.C. § 6621, the interest 
rate for underpayment of federal taxes.”  Id. at 1090. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[b]ecause postjudgment interest 
in this case is ‘interest’ on a ‘money judgment in a civil case recovered in 
court . . .  § 1961 should apply.”  Id. at 1092.  The court noted that it 
previously had held that “the § 1961 rate does reflect market rates and 
thereby fully compensate[s]’ aggrieved parties.”  Id. at 1093 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “§ 1961 applies to whistleblower 
cases that result in district court judgments because there is nothing within 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that says otherwise.”  Id. 
 
Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “[Defendant’s] demonstration of actual 
innocence of the compelling prostitution counts opens the Schlup gateway 
for all of the counts to which [defendant] pled guilty.”  Id. at 1136. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the foundation laid by Schlup v. 
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), mandates that petitioner should be permitted 
to obtain review of defaulted constitutional claims “only if he falls within 
the narrow class of cases . . .  implicating a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice.”  Vosgien, 742 F.3d at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court noted that where a petitioner does not claim “actual innocence” 
with regard to certain convictions, a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ 
has not resulted “if he remains unable to challenge them due to his own 
procedural default.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 
court determined that the defendant’s demonstration of actual innocence 
of one of the counts with which he was charged does not “open the Schlup 
gateway.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a demonstration of actual 
innocence under Schlup cannot “excuse a petitioner’s procedural default 
for more than the counts as to which he has shown actual innocence.”  Id. 
 
Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION: Whether a prisoner filing an action under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) “may seek 
damages against prison officials in their individual capacities.”  Id. at 901. 
ANALYSIS: The RLUIPA prohibits a government from encumbering 
religious exercise in correctional institutions.  Id. at 902.  The court found 
that under RLUIPA a private citizen could “assert a violation as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding in order to ‘obtain appropriate relief 
against a government.’”  Id.  The court noted that nothing in the language 
of RLUIPA demonstrated Congress’s intent to allow an individual 
government employee to be held liable.  Id. at 904.  The court reasoned 
that due to the limitations on Congress’s powers under the Spending 
Clause and the language of the RLUIPA, the only way to sue an individual 
government employee is to sue the government, because the government 
receives the federal funds.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an action against prison 
officials in their individual capacities could not be brought under RLUIPA 
because “legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause cannot 
subject state officers to individual suits,” since the prison officials are not 
the recipients of the federal funds.  Id. at 903. 
 
Yokeno v. Skiguchi, 754 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether, when there is no constitutional or statutory 
jurisdiction, the deeming clause of 28 U.S.C § 1332 may supply the 
District Court of Guam statutory jurisdiction in a suit between a resident 
alien plaintiff and a non-resident alien defendant.  Id. at 653. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the effect of the “deeming clause” of 
§ 1332, which states “[a]n alien admitted to the United States for 
permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the state in which such 
an alien is domiciled.”  Id. at 654.  The court looked to the 3rd, 7th, and 
the D.C. Circuits for interpretations of the deeming clause, and noted that 
although each circuit addressed a different issue, each court “recognize[d] 
that invoking the deeming clause to supply minimal diversity of 
citizenship where it would not otherwise exist . . . exceed[ed] 
constitutional jurisdiction.”  Id at 655–56. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the District Court of Guam 
lacked diversity subject matter jurisdiction to decide actions that were 
exclusively between aliens “[b]ecause the Constitution does not supply 
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diversity jurisdiction to Article III courts in suits between aliens,” and so 
the court in Guam must also be limited.  Id. at 657. 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Bonnet v. Harvest (US) Holdings, Inc., 741 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-
party, Tribe, in a civil suit is itself a ‘suit’ triggering tribal sovereign 
immunity in the absence of congressional authorization or tribal waiver.”  
Id. at 1156. 
ANALYSIS: The court first determined that it has jurisdiction over the 
appeal, and subsequently defined “a suit as the prosecution of some 
demand in a Court of justice.”  Id.at 1158–59 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court reasoned that a subpoena duces tecum simply compels 
the production of evidence, which is necessary for a court to fairly 
adjudicate the underlying claim.  Id.  The court determined that “a suit 
includes judicial process . . . and a subpoena duces tecum is a form of 
judicial process.”  Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the subpoena duces tecum 
served on the Tribe was “judicial process included in the suit,” and thus 
the “subpoena itself was a ‘suit’ against the Tribe triggering tribal 
sovereign immunity.”  Id. at 1155. 
 
Holmes v. Colo. Coal. for the Homeless Long Term Disability Plan, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15428 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “application of the deemed-exhausted 
provision to violations of ERISA’s notice and disclosure requirements” 
should be limited to “situations where such violations prejudice claimants 
by denying them a reasonable review procedure.”  Id. at *43. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that other “circuits have consistently 
limited” application of the “deemed-exhausted provision” to situations 
“where such violations prejudice claimants by denying them a reasonable 
review procedure.”  Id.  The court agreed with the reasoning expressed in 
the 11th Circuit that “it makes little sense to excuse plaintiffs from the 
exhaustion requirement where an employer is technically noncompliant 
with ERISA’s procedural requirements but . . . the plaintiffs still had a fair 
and reasonable opportunity to pursue a claim through an administrative 
scheme prior to filing suit in federal court.”  Id. at *40 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit joined the 2nd, 3rd, 8th, 9th, and 
11th Circuits and held that “the deemed-exhausted provision is limited to 
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instances in which the notice and disclosure deficiencies actually denied 
the participant a reasonable review procedure.”  Id. at *45–*46. 
 
In re Woods, 743 F.3d 689 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether debtors are permitted to seek relief under 
Chapter 12 as ‘family farmers,’” which necessarily required the court to 
answer the question of when “ a debt ‘for’ a principal residence ‘arise[s] 
out of a farming operation,’” and what test to apply in order to make this 
determination.  Id. at 691. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the phrase “arise out of” is used in 
an identical manner in both the rule and the exception, therefore the court 
concluded that the phrase must be interpreted “in a way that allows the 
rule’s exception to function” as an exception.  Id. at 700.  The court 
concluded that by interpreting the phrase require a “direct and substantial 
connection between the debt for a principal residence and the farming 
operation” allows the phrase to function as the exception it was intended 
to be.  Id.  The court further concluded that an “objective ‘direct-use’” test 
provides “the optimal vehicle for discerning” whether the direct-and-
substantial-connection standard is satisfied.  Id.  The direct-use test 
requires that the debt be incurred by reason of using the borrowed funds 
to fund the farming operation.  Id. at 703. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that a debt arises out of a 
farming operation “if it is directly and substantially connected to any of 
the activities constituting a ‘farming operation’ within the meaning of 
§ 101(18)(a),” and that the proper test to apply when determining if the 
operation is “directly and substantially connected” is an “objective direct-
use test.”  Id at 700. 
 
United States v. Fuller, 751 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “willfully,” as articulated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 228(a) of the Child Support Recovery Act, includes a defendant who has 
sufficient funds to pay support, as well as a defendant who lacks sufficient 
funds to pay support.  Id. at 1155. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that § 228(a) punishes one who 
“willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child 
who resides in another State.”  Id. at 1152.  Because the statute does not 
define the term “willfully,” the court looked to legislative history to 
determine its meaning.  Id. at 1155.  The court reasoned that the legislative 
history indicated that the “willful failure standard . . . should be interpreted 
in the same manner that the Federal courts have interpreted [the] felony 
tax provisions,” which the language of § 228 was borrowed from.  Id.  The 
court further noted that “the willfulness element in the tax felony statute 
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requires proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, and thus 
describes a specific intent crime.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the term “willfully” 
includes not only a defendant who possesses sufficient funds, but also “a 
defendant [who] lacks sufficient funds, so long as the defendant’s financial 
circumstances result from his own intentional acts.”  Id. at 1156. 
 
United States v. Lucero, 747 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) “pattern-of-activity 
enhancement” contains a temporal or contextual limitation.  Id. at 1247. 
ANALYSIS: The court acknowledges that Comment Note 7 of the 
guideline states that “an upward departure may be warranted if 
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) does not apply but the defendant engaged in the sexual 
abuse or exploitation of a minor” at some time.  Id. at 1248 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Further, the statute states that “pattern of 
activity” means “any combination of two or more separate instances of the 
sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether 
or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the court of the 
offense; (B) involved the same minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction.”  Id. 
at 1247–48.  The court found that the “plain text of 
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) . . . unambiguously authorize sentencing courts to apply the 
pattern-of-activity enhancement regardless of when the conduct 
underlying it occurred.”  Id. at 1248.  The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits courts have also concluded 
that there are is no temporal requirement in § 2G2.2(b)(5).  Id. at 1249–50 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held, based on the plain language of 
the statute and the consistency of other circuit court rulings, that 
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) does not contain a temporal or contextual limitation.  Id. at 
1250. 
 
United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether an expert may offer opinion testimony pursuant 
to Fed. R. Evid. 702 regarding the connection between “so-called narco-
saint iconography . . . [and] drug trafficking.”  Id. at 1105 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the reliability analysis was affected 
due to “[t]he district court’s failure to fully examine how [the expert’s] 
testimony would assist the jury.”  Id. at 1103.   The court reasoned that 
“despite the flexibility granted to the district courts, the text of Rule 702 
requires that they ensure that proffered expert testimony be based on 
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sufficient facts or data and the product of reliable principles and methods.”  
Id. at 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that allowing an expert to 
testify “based on his experience without considering the relevance of 
breath of that experience” ignores the “facts or data” requirement of Rule 
702(b).  Id. 
 
United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a person’s signature is a “name,” pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)’s definition of “means of identification” in relation 
to the aggravated identity theft statute, under U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).  Id. at 
1035. 
ANALYSIS: The court focused its analysis on the 9th Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008), which held 
that “forgoing another’s signature constitutes the use of that person’s name 
and thus qualifies as a ‘means of identification’” pursuant to § 1028A.  
Porter, 745 F.3d at 1040.  The court found that the Blixt court reasoned 
that nothing suggested that the “the use of another’s name in the form of a 
signature is somehow excluded from the definition of ‘means of 
identification.’”  Id. at 1041.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit’s 
articulation that Congress’s use of the word “any” in conjunction with the 
term “name” necessarily meant that Congress intended “to give that term 
an ‘expansive meaning,’”  Id. at 1042. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held “that a signature is the form of 
a ‘name’ for the purposes of § 1028(d)(7)’s definition of ‘means of 
identification.’”  Id. 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Castillo v. United States AG, 756 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
correctly considered the meaning of a “full pardon” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), when 
it “found petitioner removable as an aggravated felon, even though the 
[state] Board of Pardons and Paroles . . . had earlier pardoned petitioner 
for the conviction that rendered him removable.”  Id. at 1270. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the because the INA does not define 
the meaning of the term “full and unconditional pardon,” that the court had 
to review both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute 
to define the term.  Id. at 1272-73.  The court found, after considering the 
ordinary meaning of the term “unconditional pardon,” that “Congress 
clearly and unambiguously intended § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) to apply only 
2014] First Impressions 139 
when an alien secures a pardon restoring all rights vitiated by the 
underlying adjudication of guilt.”  Id.  at 1272. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “a pardon is only ‘full’ 
within the meaning of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) when it vacates all future 
punishment for the underlying conviction, thereby restoring all lost 
rights.”  Id. at 1274. (emphasis omitted). 
 
Evans v. Books-A-Million, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15269 (11th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “additional expenses, [such as mediation, legal 
research, postage and travel], which the parties agree are not taxable as 
costs under [28 U.S.C.] § 1920, may nonetheless be awarded as attorneys’ 
fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).”  Id.  at *19–20. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that its precedent requires that 
“§ 1132(g) should be interpreted consistently with similar language in 
other fee-shifting statutes,” and that “under 42 U.S.C. § 1988—which, like 
§ 1132(g)(1) allows for a reasonable attorney’s fee—a party may recover 
all reasonable expenses” incurred in litigation.  Id.   (internal quotations 
omitted).  The court noted that the Supreme Court had ruled the same way 
in 1992.  Id. at *20–21.  The court further reasoned that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th 
and 6th Circuits have held that reasonable attorneys’ fees should include 
all “incidental and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and 
competent representation.”  Id. at *20. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “reasonable litigation 
expenses such as mediation, legal research, postage, and travel may be 
recovered under § 1132(g)(1) if it is the prevailing practice in the legal 
community to bill fee-paying clients separately for those expenses.”  Id.  
at *21. 
 
Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the plaintiff’s FMLA claims were 
“prospective” under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), when the plaintiff signed a 
Severance Agreement with her employer.  Id. at 1119. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by discussing the defendant’s claim that 
“prospective rights” under the FMLA means the unexercised rights of a 
current eligible employee to take FMLA leave and to be restored to the 
same or an equivalent position after the leave.  Id.  The court stated that 
this definition was too inclusive.  Id.  All employees in the abstract possess 
a right to FMLA leave, and to interpret the word as suggested by defendant 
would mean no employer could fire any employee with outstanding 
FMLA leave.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “prospective rights” under 
the FMLA are those allowing an employee to invoke FMLA protections 
at some unspecified time in the future.  Id. 
 
U.S. CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act 
(“CEA”) authorize the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to 
regulate retail commodity transactions “offered on a leveraged or 
margined basis, or financed by the offeror, the counterparty, or a person 
acting in concert with the offeror or counterparty on a similar basis.”  Id. 
at 970. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by interpreting the plain language of the 
CEA, and found that the retail transactions at issue fell under the 
Commission’s jurisdiction.  Id. at 978.  The court noted that the retail 
transactions before it were a brokerage firm’s “allegedly off-exchange and 
fraudulent commodity transactions.”  Id. at 967.  The court reasoned that 
by using the rules of statutory construction, the ordinary meaning of the 
words of the statute required such an interpretation.  Id. at 976.  
Additionally, the court concluded that the statutory language was upheld 
because the interpretation urged by the defendant would render the act 
meaningless.  Id. at 976–77. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission had authority to regulate the transactions in question, 
because “the transactions were retail transactions, which were leveraged 
or margined by trading derivatives in its own margin trading accounts with 
precious metals companies . . . .  Id. at 967. 
 
United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether, where a course of conduct is found and the 
entrapment defense is available, “the district court should [instruct] the 
jury that if it found entrapment as to [one count] it necessarily must have 
found entrapment as to the remaining counts.”  Id. at 1298–99. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that when the 
defense of entrapment is used, although the defendant must initially show 
that the Government induced the defendant’s actions, “the burden shifts to 
the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was predisposed to commit the crime.”  Id. at 1297.  The court noted that, 
even if multiple counts could be considered one course of conduct, this 
only assists the defendant if he can “show inducement as to each count.”  
Id. at 1302.  The court reasoned that if the defendant could show they were 
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induced in the entire course of conduct, the question of predisposition 
remains, and that this question is a subjective one, therefore the facts may 
show “that an individual defendant is predisposed to commit some crimes, 
but not others.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “whether the charges 
against [the defendant] formed part of the same course of conduct is not 
determinative of when an entrapment defense applies to all counts or must 
be assessed separately by the trier of fact as to each count.”  Id. at 1300. 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
 
All Party Parliamentary Grp. on Extraordinary Rendition v. United 
States Dep’t of Def., 754 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the scope of the representative provision of the 
Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) Foreign Government Entity 
Exception extends to FOIA requests from certain foreign diplomats and 
American lawyers representing foreign diplomats.  Id. at 1048. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “‘agent’ is a traditional and 
common definition of representative, and given that reading 
‘representative’ of a foreign government entity to mean ‘agent’ of a 
foreign government entity makes perfect sense, we suspect that Congress 
would have used a different word—perhaps ‘official,’ ‘employee,’ or 
‘affiliate’—had it wanted to avoid incorporating agency principles into the 
Foreign Government Entity Exception.”  Id. at 1050.  The court noted that 
the numerous references to an entity within the United States Code, 
followed by reference to an entity’s “representatives,” ensures that such 
provisions also apply to the entity when acting through others.  Id. at 1051.  
The court reasoned that it is “reasonable to infer that Congress included 
the ‘representative’ provision in order to prevent foreign government 
entities from evading the Foreign Government Entity Exception by filing 
FOIA requests through agents, not to create a separate and independent 
class of disfavored Freedom of Information Act requesters.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that FOIA “requesters who 
have authority to file requests on behalf of foreign government entities are 
‘representatives’ of such entities when the file requests of the sort they 
have authority to file.”  Id. at 1053. 
 
Franklin-Mason v. Mabus, 742 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “a settlement agreement embodied in a judicial 
consent decree foreclose[s] jurisdiction by the Court of Federal Claims,” 
if the district court lacks jurisdiction.  Id. at 1054. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has previously held that “consent decrees and settlement 
agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and, therefore, a 
settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, ‘is a contract within 
the meaning of the Tucker Act.’”  Id. at 1057.  The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that consent decrees are viewed as judicial acts for 
the purpose of modification and enforcement, and instead recognized that 
the Supreme Court has “since clarified that consent decrees and settlement 
agreements are not, as a matter of law, mutually exclusive.”  Id. at 1058. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that the Court of Federal 
Claims is a court in which the motion to enforce “could have been 
brought.”  Id. at 1058. 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling needs to 
demonstration due diligence “during the entire 120-day appeal, during the 
period of extraordinary circumstances . . . during the period between the 
end of the extraordinary circumstances and the date of filing the 
NOA . . . or during some other period.”  Id. at 1379. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed the analysis previously articulated by 
the 2nd Circuit, explaining “that a court may suspend the statute of 
limitations for the period of extraordinary circumstances and determine 
timeliness by reference to the total untolled period without requiring a 
further showing of diligence through filing.”  Id.  The court noted that the 
Veterans Court applies a different standard, which “require[s] a showing 
of due diligence throughout the appeal period.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court adopted the 2nd Circuit’s approach, and 
held that “the diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is 
‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’”  Id. at 1380. 
 
Cronin v. United States, 765 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the 2003 Relief Act tolls the statute of 
limitations during the time a service member is on the Temporary 
Disability Retired List.  Id. at 1334–35. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the 2003 Relief Act states that 
“[t]he period of a servicemember’s military service may not be included 
in computing any period . . . for the bringing of any action . . . by . . . the 
service member.”  Id. at 1335.  The court noted that the “‘absent from 
duty’ clause thus fairly encompasses only a situation in which the active-
service duty remains – in which military authority to compel active service 
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remains – during a period when, for good cause, the member of the service 
cannot engage in the otherwise-required active service.”  Id. at 1335.  The 
court further reasoned that a member placed on the Temporary Disability 
Retired List “is not subject to an ongoing but suspended duty to serve,” 
and the military does not have the right to compel the service member to 
return back to active service.  Id.  The court found support in prior 
precedents of the court that “have treated placement on the Temporary 
Disability Retired List as relieving a service member of a duty to serve.”  
Id. at 1337. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the Civil Relief Act 
does not toll the statute of limitations for service members that are on the 
Temporary Disability Retired List.  Id. at 1331. 
 
Lemus v. DOJ, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13493 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the 90-day filing period for appeals from final 
decisions of the Bureau of Justice Assistance is jurisdictional in an action 
seeking death benefits under the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act 
(“PSOBA”).  Id. at *2. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it has exclusive jurisdiction over 
PSOBA appeals.  Id. at *2.  The court further noted that if the filing period 
is “mandatory and jurisdictional” then a late appeal must be dismissed.  Id.  
The court also reasoned that because the filing period is similar to a 
“‘claims-processing rule’ that Congress did not intend to carry 
‘jurisdictional consequences,’ then jurisdictional barriers do not bar” the 
court from considering a “request to toll the statute.”  Id. at *2–*3.  The 
court further noted that the Supreme Court treated similar provisions as 
jurisdictional, that the statute “uses language of jurisdictional 
consequence,” and that the legislative history of the statute supports such 
a finding.  Id. at *3–*6. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the statutory filing 
deadline of the PSOBA “is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable 
exception.”  Id. at *6. 
 
S. Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 567 Fed. App’x 945 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a [15 U.S.C.] § 1120 claim [for fraudulent 
registration] may be asserted on the basis of a pending trademark 
registration . . . .”  Id. at 958. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit noted that the 7th Circuit addressed 
this issue and previously stated that “[c]ompeting firms would be injured 
by the registration and use of the mark, not by the application itself.”  Id.  
The court pointed to the 7th Circuit’s findings that “[r]egistration makes it 
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hard for new firms to use marks that represent related goods, and an 
‘incontestable’ registration, as its name suggests, puts the mark beyond 
challenge on the ground that it is ‘descriptive.’” Id.  The Court also agreed 
with the 7th Circuit that “[t]he law has consistently forbidden procuring 
registration by fraud and neglected the possibility of penalizing those who 
seek but [do] not get registration via fraud.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that claims under § 1120 
may not be asserted unless the trademark is registered.  Id. at 958–99. 
 
